Autocratic Legalism Kim Lane Scheppele Upd ^new^ -

This theme is echoed in a forthcoming 2025 article in the German Law Journal , where Scheppele explores how judges at transnational courts are developing a jurisprudence that transforms the vindication of individual rights into requirements that states maintain democratic structures. While it is unclear if this jurisprudence can prevent backsliding, it may become essential as "new democrats" attempt to restore constitutional institutions using these decisions as guidelines for democratic reform.

Scheppele argues that legalistic autocrats follow a predictable "script" to hollow out liberal democracies from within:

Altering judicial appointment procedures to guarantee party loyalists fill vacancies.

In her landmark 2018 essay published in the University of Chicago Law Review , which has since been cited over 1,700 times, Scheppele defined the concept succinctly. She notes that a distinct subset exists within the general phenomenon of democratic decline: cases where "charismatic new leaders are elected by democratic publics and then use their electoral mandates to dismantle by law the constitutional systems they inherited". autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd

No constitution is perfect. Scheppele notes that all constitutional democracies have "preexisting conditions"—legal loopholes, vague emergency powers, or weak appointment mechanisms—that render them vulnerable [1.19]. Autocratic legalists do not break the system; they map its flaws and push illiberal measures through these exact fault lines [1.19]. The Universal Autocratic Playbook

Scheppele argues that autocrats follow a specific "script" to hollow out liberal democracies from within while maintaining an outward appearance of legality:

Example D — Turkey (post-2016 coup attempt) This theme is echoed in a forthcoming 2025

Reforming courts by changing judicial appointments or limiting their powers to ensure they cannot block executive actions.

As of early 2026, the framework remains strikingly relevant. A notable Verfassungsblog piece from January 2026 examines Hungary granting political asylum to Zbigniew Ziobro, Poland's former Justice Minister, who faces criminal investigations in his home country. This move, scholars argue, represents an escalation of autocratic legalism: using asylum law to shield allied autocrats from justice, exploiting mutual trust principles within the EU for political protection.

Kim Lane Scheppele is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University, affiliated with the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs and the University Center for Human Values. Her scholarly path took a decisive turn after 1989, when she moved to Eastern Europe to study the emergence of constitutional law in Hungary and Russia, living in both places for extended periods. After 9/11, she turned her attention to how the international "war on terror" eroded constitutional protections globally. Then, in 2010, she witnessed something she had not anticipated: the slow-motion dismantling of democracy in Hungary by a government that had won a supermajority at the polls. Since then, she has been documenting the rise of autocratic legalism, first in Hungary and Poland, then across the European Union and around the world. In 2024, she was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship as the Dorothy Tapper Goldman Constitutional Studies Fellow, a recognition of her growing influence. In her landmark 2018 essay published in the

: Because the leader is popular, many citizens view the dismantling of institutions as "cleaning up" a corrupt or slow-moving "old system."

What is autocratic legalism? — Core definition and central claims

Would you like a more detailed summary of the University of Chicago Law Review article, or an application of the concept to a specific country (e.g., Hungary, Poland, or the US)?